

ON A CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY

Excellent!

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Philosophy 344
Fall term, 1981

"A truth seen against the background of absurdity, and an absurdity which the teleology of consciousness presumes to be able to convert into truth, such is the primary phenomenon."¹ Such is the primary phenomenon of truth, at any rate, according to Merleau-Ponty. It is well known that Merleau-Ponty was concerned about the general topic of truth, and that some of the works which he did not live to complete were to have dealt extensively with this subject.² In this paper, I shall argue that Merleau-Ponty subscribed to at least one concept of truth throughout his career. This concept of truth is suggested by a pattern which recurs in his discussions of perception, art, language, and history. As some of Merleau-Ponty's translators have pointed out, a pattern defining the virtues and limitations of the human sense-making capacity is evident in much of his work: to wit, even if we occasionally succumb to the pretensions of absolute knowing or lapse into the despair of thoroughgoing scepticism, our ability to grasp the world's meaning, sense or intelligibility for the most part helps us to steer between these two delusory conditions.³ I shall argue that a similar pattern informs Merleau-Ponty's characterization of our grasp of truth, whether "the true"⁴ occurs in the natural world, in the socio-historical world, in the worlds of artistic or linguistic expression, in the world of personal introspection, or in the world of ideas. The true is a function of a more or less precise but never all-embracing "grip" or "hold" which we, as "body-subjects," have on reality in any of these worlds. Since we gain a grip on reality only as body-subjects, that is, only from a perspective,

we cannot legitimately expect to attain an absolute grasp of truth. The truths which a body-subject grasps are continually subject to possible revision, for a body-subject is the possibility of adopting different perspectives on reality. But our perspectival grip on truth need not lead us into complete scepticism; a body-subject's perspectives on reality can converge, overlap, and confirm each other, and they in fact tend to do so for the most part.

Merleau-Ponty's contrast between illusion and true perception brings out the peculiar and problematic character of a body-subject's grip on reality or a particular truth. In the philosophical tradition which culminates in Descartes but goes back to Plato and Aristotle, the difference between true perception and illusion lies in the character of an alleged judgment involved in each. According to this view, both illusion and true perception consist of the reception of data by the senses and a judgment of the mind about the import of the data. In the case of illusion, the judgment is incorrect, while in the case of true perception, the judgment is correct. Therefore, even the truth of the perceived world, for the traditional view, is a property of judgments rather than things.⁵ Casting aside the notions of sensory data and intellectual judgment as misleading, Merleau-Ponty speaks of the exploratory movement of a body-subject, and of a gaze in particular, which is guided by a silent language or logic of perception - a "logos of the aesthetic world"⁶ - toward a precise grip on reality. A body-subject is a being-in-the-world, or the power to anchor in various "abodes" and within various

"horizons," which in turn are seemingly laid out in advance so that the perspectives adopted from and within them can all converge on a reality or truth becoming-determinate. Put another way, the exploratory movement of a body-subject tends to come to rest at a certain normal or optimal situation in which the true character of something comes to light.

For science and objective thought, an apparently small object seen a hundred yards away is indistinguishable from the same object seen ten yards away at a greater angle But for me the perceiver, the object a hundred yards away is not real and present in the sense in which it is at ten yards, and I identify the object in all its positions, at all distances, in all appearances, in so far as all the perspectives converge towards the perception which I obtain at a certain distance and with a certain typical orientation. This privileged perception ensures the unity of the perceptual process and draws into it all other appearances. For each object, as for each picture in an art gallery, there is an optimum distance from which it requires to be seen A living body, seen at too close quarters, and divorced from any background against which it can stand out, is no longer a living body, but a mass of matter as outlandish as a lunar landscape Again, seen from too great a distance, the body loses its living value, and is seen simply as a puppet or automaton. The living body itself appears when its microstructure is neither excessively nor insufficiently visible, and this moment equally determines its real size and shape.⁷

True perception, then, depends not on the correctness of a judgment, but rather on the optimal bodily attitude for getting a grip on the real character of something. But the achievement of an optimal bodily attitude does not distinguish

Husserl: it explores at a certain point
 true perception from illusion, for it is a necessary condition of either one. Illusion also involves attaining a grip which is motivated by a structure of cues in the perceived world. The grip in illusion is less precise than the grip in true perception, and the reality grasped is less clearly articulated. But attaining a grip on anything at all requires "pinning one's faith" on the world, no less in illusion than in true perception.⁸ Merleau-Ponty's discussion of painting clarifies this common dependence of illusion and true perception on the achievement of an optimal bodily stance. It is no accident that he speaks, in the long passage quoted above, of the normal conditions for viewing a painting as well as for gaining a grip on reality. Painters can be masters of illusion, in so far as they present in their work many of the motifs which we follow in gaining a grip on reality. Painters can even offer enough cues to motivate the observer to take an illusory grip on "the things themselves."⁹ Or, as in non-representative painting, they can engage merely in "multiplying the systems of equivalences" and offering "to vision its inward tapestries" by "severing their adherence to the envelope of things."¹⁰

What seems to distinguish illusion from true perception is a premature coming-to-rest of the body-subject on a "reality" which will not support further exploration. The fact that I have grasped not a truth but an illusory reality will come quickly to light if I vary my perspective on it or attempt to carry my exploratory movement further. An illusion, like a painting, offers us only a "familiar face with its expression immediately understood" and motivating our grip on it. The

real, however, is also "hostile and alien, no longer an interlocutor, but a resolutely silent Other, a Self which evades us no less than does the intimacy of an outside consciousness."¹¹ To the extent that the real evades me as an alien Other, it will support unending exploration. *yes!*

But how can a body-subject ever come to rest at a grip on the genuinely real or on a particular truth, if further exploration might reveal this to have been a grip on illusion? Perhaps the genuinely real or the true supports a grip which remains firm or precise when I adopt a number of perspectives or optimal bodily attitudes with respect to it. But this grip then seems dangerously like that of the absolute knower, who pretends that all of reality can be reduced to a familiar face which can be completely understood. I seem to be faced with the unhappy choice of either stopping my exploratory movement toward a grip on reality too soon, at the illusory "object" of absolute knowing, or continuing it without end and thus falling into a sceptical abyss. *good*

The grip on truth, according to the pattern evident in many of Merleau-Ponty's writings, is supposed to occupy a secure position beyond the pretensions of absolute knowing and the despair of thoroughgoing scepticism. But his discussion of true perception and illusion seems to make the situation of this grip problematic. I think that Merleau-Ponty secures the position of the grip on truth in the following way. Illusion involves a reality which is grasped as the result of the premature termination of an exploratory movement, and which will not support further exploratory movement. True perception involves a reality which is grasped with constant firmness from varying perspectives to

Are all illusions discovered ones?

It could conceivably explode?

a point, and which supports an exploratory movement ending in intention but unending in fact. "To a point" means that a particular truth can be grasped more firmly from different perspectives than an illusion can be, but that there will be one or more perspectives from which a truth will be seen to be only a particular truth. * Any truth is still a particular truth, and not an illusion, but not the whole truth. "Ending in intention but unending in fact" means that an exploratory movement aims to come to rest at a final, total truth (hence, the "teleology of consciousness"), but never does so. A body-subject's exploratory movement is temporal, but this is a temporality which integrates the particular truths already arrived at into the particular truths yet to come. In other words, an ongoing exploratory movement integrates the particular truths arrived at yesterday into the more general truths arrived at today, and will integrate the latter into the still more general truths to be arrived at tomorrow. Therefore, on the one hand, any particular truth ought never to be subsequently rejected as a mere illusion by further exploration, but can be incorporated, as a "sediment" or abstract truth, into a more concrete truth. On the other hand, a final, total truth can be aimed at in an exploratory movement, but a grip can in fact be achieved only on increasingly general truths. No particular truth is ever entirely lost, but no total truth is ever found.

My grip on truth in the perceived world is thus a definite sort of grip which falls between the complete grip of absolute knowing and the absence of grip of thoroughgoing scepticism.

* *True for some (set of) situation(s)?*

This would mean scepticism only of "situation" as

*we are
"sure enough"*

subjectively

sometimes

My grip on ideal truths apparently fits into this pattern in the same way:

When I think the Pythagorean theorem and recognize it as true, it is clear that this truth is not for this moment only. Nevertheless later progress in knowledge will show that it is not yet a final, unconditioned evidence and that, if the Pythagorean theorem and the Euclidean system once appeared as final, unconditioned evidences, that is itself the mark of a certain cultural epoch. Later developments would not annul the Pythagorean theorem but would put it back in its place as a partial, and also an abstract, truth. Thus here also we do not have a timeless truth but rather the recovery of one time by another time, just as, on the level of perception, our certainty about perceiving a given thing does not guarantee that our experience will not be contradicted, or dispense us from a fuller experience of that thing.¹²

Since the unconditioned evidence accompanying ideal truths "is itself the mark of a certain cultural epoch," I shall postpone my discussion of ideal truth until I have considered the grip on truth in the social and cultural worlds.

It seems that a body-subject can achieve the same sort of grip on the truth or reality of "other selves and the human world" as it can on "things and the natural world." In either case, my grip on particular truths seems to be the outcome of an exploratory movement guided by a structure of motives or silent logic immanent in the perceived world.¹³ Artifacts, institutions, and the behavior patterns of Others seem to disclose their truth or reality to a body-subject in the same way as things in the natural world. Both a thing and another

person display expressive faces to my exploratory gaze, against a background of Otherness that I can explore indefinitely. Given this similarity, however, there are some characteristics which seem to distinguish the human world from the natural world, and which seem to pose further problems for a grip on the truth of the former.

First, the other person, as a body-subject, is, as I am, for-itself, while the thing obviously is not. Thus, as Merleau-Ponty says, Paul's grief can never have the same significance for me as it has for him.¹⁴ In so far as what Paul's grief is for him is a constitutive part of what Paul's grief is, the grip of another body-subject would seem to be cut off from an important part of the truth of Paul's behavior pattern. The behavior pattern of another person seems to have for my gaze a dimension of Otherness or transcendence beyond that which he already shares with a thing.

Second, other body-subjects secrete their behavior patterns into the world around them, as I also do, in such a way that artifacts acquire faces no less expressive than our behavior patterns as body-subjects. So if Paul's grief never quite is for him what it is for me, the same could be said of the artifacts surrounding him.¹⁵ Therefore, the grip of any body-subject would seem to be cut off from an important part of the truth of "objective mind" (any artifact, institution, or cultural object), to the extent that what objective mind is for an indefinite number of perspectives, many of which a body-subject can never fully adopt, is a constitutive part of what objective mind is.

It seems, then, that the spectre of scepticism ought to haunt my grip on the truth of the human world even more than it haunts my grip on the truth of the natural world.¹⁶

Although my grip on the truth of the human world or objective mind seems compromised by my inability to coincide entirely with another person's grip on it, it seems that my grip on the truth of "subjective mind," or my own states of thinking, feeling, and willing, is, on the contrary, all-embracing, by virtue of the coincidence of my own perspectives with myself. Unfortunately, according to Merleau-Ponty, I am in no better position to attain a grip on the truth of myself than I am to attain a grip on the truth of the human world "outside" myself. There can be, for example, illusory love as well as true love. I can be under the illusion that I am committed with my whole being to someone or some cause, just when I am in fact play-acting with one of my personae.¹⁷ I am not hooked up by a hotline to my own states just because they are my own states; some of my feelings and commitments can be just as illusory for me as the character of "external" things. As Merleau-Ponty bluntly puts it, "introspection gives me almost nothing."¹⁸ To believe that I can merely "look inside" in order to distinguish my genuine commitments from sheer play-acting is itself an illusion. The only way I might have of getting a grip on the truth of myself, then, is to explore my behavior patterns as another person would "from the outside." But now I have come full circle to the original problem posed by my grip on the truth of the human world: since the social is "not a determinable

object, but is what comes about on the fringes of all perspectives, and on which they are erected,"¹⁹ its truth does not seem graspable unless I can adopt an indefinite number of other perspectives in principle not adoptable by me.

According to Merleau-Ponty, however, the problem posed by the alien perspectives of other people is not unresolvable. I normally take a grip on the truth of artifacts, institutions, and behavior patterns as one would take a grip on it, ignoring the first-person character of my perspective and those of other people.²⁰ As Merleau-Ponty says, "if perspective distortions were expressly given to us, we should not have to learn perspective" (including my own perspective).²¹ Moreover, even after I have matured or learned perspective, I never entirely abandon my childhood faith that other people see the world just as I do. Only the preservation of this faith, as I acquire perspective, enables me to arrive at truths in an intersubjective world:

The unsophisticated thinking of our earliest years remains as an indispensable acquisition underlying that of maturity, if there is to be for the adult one single intersubjective world. My awareness of constructing an objective truth would never provide me with anything more than an objective truth for me, and my greatest attempt at impartiality would never enable me to prevail over my subjectivity (as Descartes so well expresses it by the hypothesis of the malignant demon), if I had not, underlying my judgments, the primordial certainty of being in contact with being itself, if, before any voluntary adoption of a position I were not already situated in an intersubjective world, and if science too were not upheld by this basic doxa.

With the cogito begins that struggle between consciousnesses, each one of which, as Hegel says, seeks the death of the other. For the struggle ever to begin, and for each consciousness to be capable of suspecting the alien presences which it negates, all must necessarily have some common ground and be mindful of their peaceful co-existence in the world of childhood.²²

Finally, my maturation or acquisition of perspective need not dissolve this primary faith in a common world or an intersubjective truth. Others and I can engage in an effort to share our perspectives, which can slip into each other even though they can never entirely coincide, by means of the intersensory communication of behavior patterns or the cultural-object communication of manipulanda.²³

Not just any form of communication enables me to gain a grip on truth, however. Merleau-Ponty remarks somewhat cryptically that speech, rather than gestures and other modes of behavior-pattern communication or painting and other modes of cultural-object communication, is especially suited to serve this task.²⁴ He seems to have two reasons for singling out speech or prose as the cultural vehicle which augments a body-subject's grip on truth.

First, writers, or writers of "committed" prose, at any rate, adopt truth as the presumptive aim of their efforts at expression, so that their work seems to open out on one world. While the work of each writer expresses a unique perspective on the truth, this truth is presumed to be the common support of an indefinite number of such perspectives.

Second, language is distinctively fit to house the grips or perspectives which a number of body-subjects have taken on

particular truths as sediments in an ongoing tradition of exploration. Each body-subject accomplishes such an integration for itself alone in ordinary perception and in the other modes of communication, but only speech or prose can do the same job for a community of body-subjects in an intersubjective world. Merleau-Ponty calls attention to the unique truth-bearing capacity of prose by comparing it with painting:

Precisely because painting is always something to be created, the works which the new painter is going to produce will be added to already created works. The new do not make the old useless, nor do they expressly contain them. They rival them.

Thus painting as a whole presents itself as an abortive effort to say something which remains to be said. Although the man who writes is not content to simply extend existing language, he is no more anxious to replace it by an idiom which, like a painting, is sufficient unto itself and closed in upon its ultimate signification. The given language . . . does not stand before him as an enemy. It is entirely ready to convert everything now he stands for as a writer into an acquisition.

It is essential to truth to be integral, whereas no painting has ever pretended to be.²⁵

If each painting rivals all previous paintings and foreshadows future rivals, while each work of prose presumes to retrieve the past, or does not push it aside but offers its truth, then it is clear which form of cultural-object communication is best suited to serve as an appendage of a body-subject's grip on truths. The situation of the cinema as a cultural object or manipulandum is peculiar, however,

for it seems to share in some of the characteristics of both painting and prose. Within each individual film, the presentation of a temporal accrual of perspectives, similar to that which occurs in speech and in ordinary perception, is possible. A film is, after all, a "temporal gestalt," and the display of varying perspectives by means of the montage technique closely resembles the intersubjective circuit which a writer travels in a work of prose.²⁶ But it might be too strong a claim to say that the "language" of the cinema can bear acquired truths from work to work in a cumulative manner, as is presumed in a tradition of literature. It might be safer to say that the cinema more closely resembles painting when one's attention is drawn to the relations between individual works. In other words, individual films seem to rival each other, and their directors do not presume to preserve, elevate, and extend the sediment of truths already acquired in previous films.

In any case, speech seems to augment the grip on truth by installing the exploratory movements of each speaker in an intersubjective tradition accessible to any body-subject. Any body-subject can draw on or contribute to this tradition of expression in order to augment his grip on truth. The grip on truth in the "figurative" world of expression is no less subject to the pattern that characterizes the grip on truth in the "literal" worlds of things and other people, however. The perspectives of speakers and writers tend to accumulate and converge on particular truths which become sediments in an ongoing tradition of exploration. As in perception, this

convergence of perspectives in a tradition of expression saves me from a thoroughgoing scepticism: no particular truth is ever superceded as a mere illusion by further exploration. But a tradition of expression never enables me to arrive at a final or total truth into which all particular truths could be integrated in one moment of absolute knowing. A tradition of expression augments a body-subject's grip on truth by placing at his disposal the outcome of an intersubjective exploration of the natural and human worlds, but this outcome is also only a moment of a task yet to be accomplished.

I am now ready to consider Merleau-Ponty's assertion that the unconditioned evidence characterizing an ideal truth is the mark of a certain cultural epoch.²⁸ This claim is ambiguous. The cultural epoch referred to could be that of modern or Cartesian philosophy, for which the distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact assumes central importance. For this epoch all and only ideal truths, as truths of reason, would possess unconditioned evidence. Or the cultural epoch referred to could be any epoch for which some truths possess unconditioned evidence. On this interpretation, the truths possessing unconditioned evidence for one cultural epoch may not possess it for another, and this is how I discover that the unconditioned evidence accompanying any ideal truth is the mark of a certain cultural epoch. For example, which is the genuine truth of reason for the Cartesian epoch: a truth of Newtonian physics or a truth of Einsteinian physics? Neither one, it seems. The former is an ideal truth possessing unconditioned

evidence for the Newtonian epoch, while the latter is an ideal truth possessing unconditioned evidence for the Einsteinian epoch. It seems that if the cultural epoch referred to is that of Cartesian philosophy, then all ideal truths eternally retain unconditioned evidence as truths of reason for absolute knowers. But if the cultural epoch referred to is one for which only some ideal truths possess unconditioned evidence while others do not, then all ideal truths lose their unconditioned evidence for the sceptical observer of different epochs.

Once again, however, the pattern situating my grip on truth, in this case on ideal truth, assures me that this grip lies beyond the apparent dilemma of absolute knowing and thoroughgoing scepticism. Merleau-Ponty's treatment of Marxism as a type of ideal truth is an instructive instance of his general approach to ideal truth. A full discussion of Merleau-Ponty's encounter with Marxism would be beyond the scope of this paper, but it is well known that his views on Marxism underwent an important shift during his career.²⁸ After rescuing what he took to be the truth of Marxism from its bourgeois critics and vulgar sympathizers, Merleau-Ponty briefly brought it to bear as an instrument augmenting his grip on the truth of the socio-historical world, but finally revised his estimate of the truth of the instrument itself.²⁹ Given the alternative interpretations of "cultural epoch" outlined above, Merleau-Ponty could have regarded Marxism as an ideal truth possessing unconditioned evidence for all time, or as an ideal truth possessing unconditioned evidence for one and only one cultural epoch. Since he in fact revised

cf C. I. Lewis
"The Pragmatic Approach"

his position on Marxism, Merleau-Ponty must have found its truth to possess: unconditioned evidence for only one epoch, namely, the epoch which ruled his own early estimate of its truth. The first alternative, to take Marxism as one of a number of eternal truths of reason for an absolute knower, was never a live option for Merleau-Ponty; his own early assessment of Marxism itself ruled out this possibility. But did his final estimate of Marxism, as a type of ideal truth with unconditioned evidence for only one epoch, imply a thoroughgoing scepticism about either Marxism in particular or ideal truths in general?

If one pays attention to Merleau-Ponty's characterization of the grip on truth in perception and in expression, it should come as no surprise that a grip on ideal truth can also avoid the alternatives of scepticism and absolute knowing. The truth of Marxism, as a type of ideal truth, ought not to be consigned to a garbage-heap of mere illusions, if it is found to have unconditioned evidence for one cultural epoch only:

Marxism has definitely entered a new phase of its history, in which it can inspire and orient analyses and retain a real heuristic value, but it is certainly no longer true in the sense in which it was believed to be true.

Even in the sciences, an outmoded theoretical framework can be reintegrated into the language of the one which replaced it; it remains significant, keeps its truth.

Marx's theses can remain true as the Pythagorean theorem is true: no longer in the sense it was true for the one who invented it - as an immutable truth or property of space itself - but as a property of a certain model of space among other possible spaces.³⁰

Ideal truths, like perceived truths, can be superceded, but only by being taken up as sediments into more integral truths, which in turn may be superceded by exploration in future cultural epochs. Like any other truth, the truth of Marxism is not eternal, or is eternal only as an acquisition of exploration enabling a community of body-subjects to carry this exploration further.

Notes

1. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phenomenology of Perception (hereinafter referred to as PHP), Colin Smith, trans., London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, p. 296.

2. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, "A Prospectus of His Work," Arleen Dallery, trans., in The Primacy of Perception (hereinafter referred to as PRP), James Edie, ed., Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964, pp. 6-7.

3. See, e.g., Dreyfus, Herbert and Dreyfus, Patricia, "Translator's Introduction," in Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Sense and Non-Sense (hereinafter referred to as SNS), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964, pp. ix-xxvii; McCleary, Richard, "Translator's Preface," in Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Signs, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964, pp. ix-xxxii.

4. In PHP, Merleau-Ponty often places the terms "true" and "truth" within scare-quotes. I think he employs this convention to indicate that these terms are not being used in the traditional manner, namely, to refer to a correspondence between a proposition and an extramental reality. Ironically enough, however, he still seems to use these terms to refer to a sort of correspondence: a correspondence between the grip of a body-subject and a reality revealed under the optimal conditions of attaining this grip.

5. See, e.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics 1027b-25; De Anima 427a-17-428b-25; Descartes, Meditations, IV; Merleau-Ponty, PHP, p. 32 and n.

6. Merleau-Ponty, PHP, p. 429 and n.

7. PHP, p. 302.
8. PHP, pp. 296-97.
9. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, "Cezanne's Doubt," in SNS, pp. 17-18; see also Gombrich, E.H., Art and Illusion, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 181-291.
10. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, "Eye and Mind," in PRP, pp. 164-65, 182.
11. Merleau-Ponty, PHP, p. 322.
12. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences," in PRP, p. 20.
13. For Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the concept of motive, see, e.g., PHP, pp. 48-50, 258-59.
14. PHP, p. 356.
15. PHP, pp. 197, 319-20, 353.
16. Under some circumstances, however, the difference between the natural world and the human world, or between thing and artifact, may not be so great as Merleau-Ponty's analysis implies. For example, in primitive experience a thing as well as a person seems to be for-itself. There also seems to be no reason why a thing cannot acquire the expressive face of a body-subject, or why the latter cannot secrete its expressive behavior indifferently into the natural world or the artifactual world.
17. Merleau-Ponty, PHP, pp. 378-79.
18. Merleau-Ponty, SNS, p. 52.
19. Merleau-Ponty, PHP, p. 363.
20. PHP, pp. 82, 354.
21. PHP, p. 260.

22. PHP, p. 355.

23. For Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the distinction between these two modes of communication, see, e.g., PHP, pp. 185, 348, 354, 361.

24. PHP, pp. 190, 391.

25. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," in Signs, Richard McCleary, trans., Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964, pp. 79-80.

26. Merleau-Ponty, SNS, pp. 54-58.

27. See note 12 above.

28. See, e.g., note 4 above.

29. For Merleau-Ponty's early assessment, see, e.g., PHP, pp. 171-173n; "Marxism and Philosophy," in SNS, pp. 125-36. For his employment of Marxism as an instrument of understanding social and cultural phenomena (including the phenomenon of Marxism itself), see, e.g., Humanism and Terror, John O'Neill, trans., Boston: Beacon Press, 1969; The Adventures of the Dialectic, Joseph Bien, trans., Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, pp. 9-58. For Merleau-Ponty's revised estimate of the truth of Marxism, see, e.g., The Adventures of the Dialectic, pp. 59-233; Signs, pp. 3-35.

30. Merleau-Ponty, Signs, pp. 9-10.